Peer Sexual Harassment in California after Davis by Walsh, John F.
Hastings Women’s Law Journal
Volume 12 | Number 1 Article 9
1-1-2001
Peer Sexual Harassment in California after Davis
John F. Walsh
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hwlj
Part of the Law and Gender Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Women’s Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
John F. Walsh, Peer Sexual Harassment in California after Davis, 12 Hastings Women's L.J. 215 (2001).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hwlj/vol12/iss1/9
Peer Sexual Harassment in California After Davis
John F. Walsh*
I. INTRODUCTION
On the day the United States Supreme Court issued Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education,' a local newspaper reporter asked for my
reaction as an attorney who represents California schools and colleges. In
one regard, the question was relatively straightforward to answer: given the
Supreme Court's Title IX employee-to-student harassment decision of the
previous term, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,2 its
adoption of the same actual knowledge/deliberate indifference standard3 for
peer harassment hardly came as a surprise. The Court adopted neither the
National School Boards Association's argument that damages under Title
IX should only be available against grant recipients for employee wrongs
under narrow circumstances nor the "knew or should have known" or
constructive knowledge standard used by the Office for Civil Rights
("OCR") of the U.S. Department of Education in administrative
enforcement actions.
As a practicing school attorney, it has become clear to me that the
Davis decision raises far more practice questions than it does provide
answers. Additionally, from my clients' standpoint, the Supreme Court's
implied criticism of school administration practice does not make much
sense. For almost a decade, California school districts have been required,
as a matter of state law, to adopt and implement district-wide policy,
complaint and investigation procedures for peer- and employee-to-student
sexual harassment matters. Peer harassment is a separate ground for
* John Walsh is an attorney with the law firm of Best, Best & Krieger LLP in
Riverside, California. Mr Walsh graduated cum laude from Loyola Law School
and holds a doctorate in history from the Claremont Graduate School. I would like
to offer my thanks to my colleagues Angie Castillo, Mala Subramanian, Charisse
L. Smith and Megan Starr, and my wife Katherine Liegler, for invaluable
assistance and support.
1. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
2. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
3. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.
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student discipline under the California Education Code.4 Given the often
considerable efforts made by California school districts throughout the
1990s to train staff on sexual harassment complaint and investigation
procedures, the overwhelming school administrator reaction to Davis
appears to have been: (1) why is the Supreme Court now imposing this new
source of liability under Title IX and (2) how does this affect our current
harassment policies and investigation procedures?
From a legal standpoint, much of the confusion among California
school administrators regarding the Davis decision stems from two
difficulties: first, understanding the parameters of the Davis decision itself,
and second, "placing" Davis with respect to pre-existing sources of
California and Ninth Circuit law. Quite simply, Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion in Davis is a rather formalist interpretation of the Title IX
statutory scheme, falling well short of providing needed practical guidance
to practitioners and school administrators. Moreover, the majority opinion
does not clearly define the parameters of actionable peer harassment. The
remaining questions are: (1) who among school administrators and officials
must hold actual knowledge, such that institutional liability may be
imputed; (2) what types of harms a plaintiff must demonstrate to maintain a
peer harassment cause of action and (3) where, when and under what
contexts institutional liability may be imposed under Title IX. Further,
California administrators, like their counterparts elsewhere, must now
attempt to understand the interrelationship between Title IX peer liability
and possible state causes of action, as well as the relationship between
private Title IX lawsuits and OCR administrative enforcement actions.
This Article attempts to clarify the questions posed by Davis for
California schools and to give, to the extent possible in this rapidly
changing area of the law, practical guidance as to what Title IX liability
issues may now confront schools. It will first discuss Ninth Circuit law
related to peer harassment prior to Davis, then analyze Davis itself from a
practical standpoint, with a particular eye to areas of uncertainty raised by
the majority opinion. The Article will next address peer harassment as a
cause of action under California law and discuss the interrelationship and
overlap between Title IX and California law. Finally, this Article will
discuss liability and immunity defense issues.
4. See CAL. EOUC. CODE § 48900.2 (2000).
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II. FEDERAL LAW REGARDING PEER SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
A. APPROACHES TO TITLE IX PEER HARASSMENT LAWSUITS PRIOR TO
DAVIS
Title IX does not expressly prohibit sexual harassment,5 nor does this
statutory scheme expressly allow private parties to bring suit for money
damages. The legislative history of Title IX similarly fails to indicate
whether Congress intended to proscribe peer harassment, and whether it
even considered peer sexual harassment to be a form of discrimination
based on sex.7
Given this lack of statutory clarity, the circuits' split prior to Gebser
and Davis over whether Title IX supported a private cause of action for
sexual harassment and, if it did, whether the liability standard should be
analogized to Title V15 or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In
Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District,'0 the Fifth Circuit
concluded that Title IX could not support sexual harassment suits "absent
allegations that the school district itself directly discriminated based on
sex."" Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Title IX liability could
only be premised on an agency theory, not on principles of vicarious
liability or an independent duty to protect third parties.'2
Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit, in its Davis decision," adopted a
five-prong test for peer harassment under which a plaintiff must show:
(1) that she [or he] is a member of a protected group; (2) that she
[or he] was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the
harassment was based on sex; (4) that the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of her
[or his] education and create an abusive educational environment;
5. Title IX states: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex.., be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
6. See id.
7. See 117 CONG. REc. 39252 (1971) (statement of Rep. Mink).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (2000).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
10. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 861 (1996).
11. Id. at 1008.
12. See id. at 1011. Other courts have adopted this reasoning. See, e.g., Franks v.
Kentucky Sch. for the Deaf, 956 F. Supp. 741,748 (E.D. Ky. 1996), aff'd, 142 F.3d 360 (6th
Cir. 1998); Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't of Davidson County, Tenn., 32 F. Supp. 2d 991
(M.D. Tenn. 1998); Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995);
Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Wright v.
Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
13. 74 F.3d 1186, 1193 (11th Cir. 1996). This case was subsequently vacated by the
Eleventh Circuit. However, the original decision was used as the basis for reasoning in
other circuits.
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and (5) that some basis for institutional liability has been
established.
4
Following Title VII case law, the Eleventh Circuit held that a peer
harassment suit could be maintained under Title IX where the plaintiff
proves that school officials and employees knew or should have known of
the harassment and failed to take "prompt and remedial action to end the
wrongful conduct."'5
As did the other circuits, the Ninth Circuit struggled with the
appropriate Title IX liability standard for peer harassment. Throughout the
1990s, two questions shaped Ninth Circuit analysis regarding peer
harassment liability under Title IX: (1) what should the institutional
liability standard be for third party damage suits and (2) under what
circumstances might school officials and employees be personally liable
through 42 U.S.C. section 1983 actions for third party acts of peer
harassment.
In Doe v. Petaluma City School District,6 a Ninth Circuit district court
first addressed peer harassment under Title IX. Jane Doe, a junior high
school student, sued her school district and various school administrators
because she had been the subject of harassing comments from classmates
for almost two school years. 7 Though plaintiff Doe's parents frequently
complained to administrators about this abusive conduct, school
administrators took no action until after a fellow student physically
assaulted her. Finally, she transferred to a private girls' school and sued
the school district under Title IX.
The Petaluma I court struggled over whether to apply Title VI or Title
VII standards to her allegations.' 8 If Title VI applied, the plaintiff would be
required to prove that the district itself intentionally discriminated against
her when investigating her complaints. '9 Conversely, if Title VII applied,
the plaintiff would only be required to show that the institution knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate
measures.2 ' To resolve these questions, the Petaluma I court considered the
Supreme Court's decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,2'
where the Court first held that money damages were available under Title
14. Id. at 1194.
15. Id. at 1195.
16. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993) [hereinafter Petaluma I], subsequent appeal, Doe
v. Petaluma Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Petaluma III, different
results reached on reconsideration, Doe v. Petaluma Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) [hereinafter Petaluma III].
17. See Petaluma 1, 830 F. Supp. at 1564-66.
18. ld. at 1571-73.
19. See id. at 1573.
20. See id. at 1571.
21. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
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IX.2 In Franklin, the Court impliedly analogized Title IX to Title VI
because each was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause' ' Using the
contract analogy for the Spending Clause first offered in Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman,24 the Petaluma I court imported Title
VI standards and held that institutional liability only attached where an
employee of the school actually knew of the discrimination and failed to
take appropriate remedial action 5
In Petaluma III, the court reconsidered this liability standard, reversed
its earlier decision and held that Title VII's "knew or should have known"
standard was more appropriate for peer sexual harassment.26  Under the
Petaluma III standard, liability attached to a grant recipient where: (1) the
gender based harassment was so severe or pervasive as to create a hostile
environment and (2) the plaintiff proved that the entity actually knew or
should have known of the harassment.27 The court also indicated that no
liability attaches if the school took prompt remedial action.2 Reiterated in
Nicole M., this became the Ninth Circuit peer harassment standard until
Davis.2
Prior to Davis, the Ninth Circuit also struggled with the question of
whether personal liability might attach to school officials and
administrators through 42 U.S.C. section 1983 actions for a failure to
prevent third party acts of sexual harassment.30 In Oona, R. -S. v. Santa
22. See id. at 76.
23. Id. at 70-71.
24. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). "Unlike legislation enacted under § 5 [of the 14th amendment]
... legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract:
in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.
The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on
whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.' There can,
of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to
ascertain what is expected of it." Id. at 17 (citations omitted).
25. See Petaluma I, 830 F. Supp. at 1574; accord Oona, R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Sch.,
890 F. Supp. 1452, 1466 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
26. Petaluma 111, 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
27. See id; see also Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D.
Cal. 1997). The Nicole M. court's rationale was the "knew or should have known" standard
requires severe or pervasive conduct that would ordinarily give notice to a reasonable
administrator. The position of teacher would be sufficient for institutional liability to attach,
given the status relationship between teachers and students.
Certainly, this rule is even more compelling in the case of principals, vice
principals and other school employees responsible for student discipline and
a school's educational environment. In other words, an official or a
supervisor of students such as a principal, vice principal or teacher cannot
[ignore harassing conduct] once she [or he] has been alerted to a severe and
pervasive hostile... environment [claim].
Id. at 1378; see also Oona, R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1466-70 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
28. See Petaluma III, 949 F. Supp. at 1426.
29. Nicole M., 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal 1997).
30. See Oona, R.-S., 890 F. Supp. at 1459-62.
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Rosa City School District, the district court concluded that based on
legislative history and review of Franklin itself, Congress had not
foreclosed the use of section 1983 actions under Title IX.3' The Nicole M.
court agreed, concluding that the lack of enforcement procedures set forth
in Title IX permitted private plaintiffs to state such a claim against school
officials in their individual capacities.32
B. DAVIS V. MONROE COUNTY
The facts in Davis are well-known and quite egregious. In 1993,
Aurelia Davis brought suit against Monroe County Board of Education, a
Title IX funding recipient, alleging that the Board had failed to protect her
daughter LaShonda, a ten-year old fifth grade student, from acts of sexual
harassment perpetrated by a fellow student, G.F.33 As alleged in the
complaint, LaShonda had been subjected to a six-month barrage of
offensive and abusive conduct, including vulgar sexual comments, fondling
and rubbing and other inappropriate touching by G.F.34 LaShonda
apparently reported these instances to her teachers and her mother.35 Ms.
Davis contacted one of LaShonda's teachers and requested that LaShonda
be transferred to another classroom, which did not occur.3 6  Unlike
California school districts, Monroe County did not have a sexual
harassment policy and complaint investigation procedure in place.
37
LaShonda's harassment ended when G.F. plead guilty to charges of sexual
battery.38
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court ruled in Davis that a
funding recipient may be liable for monetary damages under Title IX for
peer sexual harassment (1) where it was deliberately indifferent to acts of
sexual harassment; (2) of which it had actual knowledge and (3) which was
so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it deprived the victim of
access to educational opportunities or benefits.34 Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion concluded Title IX liability would only be imposed for a
grant recipient's own acts (or failure to act) of deliberate indifference to
known harassing conduct within its control, not through principles of
vicarious liability for the acts of third parties."n
Much of Justice O'Connor's opinion focused on a statutory
31. Id. at 1461.
32. Nicole M., 964 F. Supp. at 1381.
33. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1999).
34. See id at 633-34.
35. See id. at 634.
36. See id. at 635.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 634.
39. Id. at 645-52.
40. See id. at 644-45.
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interpretation of Title IX.4' Noting that Title IX, like Title VI, was adopted
under Congress's Spending Clause powers, Justice O'Connor reasoned that
Title IX represented a contract between educational institution funding
recipients and the federal government.42 Consequently, prior to any damage
assessment, the grant recipient must have notice of its breach of the Title's
terms and conditions. 3 Monroe County had argued that the plain language
of Title IX had not placed it on notice that it may be subject to liability for
third party wrongs.' The Davis majority concurred, but emphasized that
Ms. Davis was attempting to hold Monroe County liable for its own
indifference in the face of known acts of harassment.45
C. IssuES FLOWING FROM THE DAVIS DECISION
The Davis decision raises numerous questions from a practical
standpoint, some of which the circuits have now begun to address.
Specifically, the decision raises questions regarding: (1) what constitutes
"actual" notice; (2) what is "deliberate indifference" or a "clearly
unreasonable" response to peer harassment and (3) under what
circumstances do schools have sufficient control over harassing situations
such that Title IX liability might attach.
1. Actual Notice
The actual notice standard announced in Davis raises two fundamental
questions. First, what constitutes institutional "notice" of the complained
of harassment? Second, what employee/administrative categories must
have actual notice such that Title IX liability may be imputed to the
institution? In Gebser, Justice O'Connor defined the employee who must
have knowledge as "an official who at a minimum has authority to address
the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the
recipient's behalf .... "46 In Davis itself, the actual notice requirement was
satisfied by repeated complaints to teachers and the school's principal.47
Different definitions of "actual knowledge" have emerged among the
circuits. Applying Davis, some courts have held that an educational
institution is placed on notice where a student expressly complains to a
teacher about the harm at issue or where a teacher witnesses the incidents
of alleged harassment.4' Additionally, in Doe v. School Administrative
41. See id.
42. See id. at 640.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 640-41.
46. 524 U.S. 274,290 (1998).
47. 526 U.S. 649, 653-54.
48. See Carroll K. v. Fayette County Bd. of Educ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 618, 621-22 (S.D. W.
Va. 1998); Morlock v. West Cent. Educ. Dist., 46 F. Supp. 2d 892, 908 (1999).
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District No. 19,49 a First Circuit district court held that a school district had
notice for Title IX purposes where it knew of a teacher's pattern of
wrongful relationships, even if the school was not aware of the specific
wrongful relationship at issue in the lawsuit. The Doe court also concluded
that the "actual knowledge" prong meant that the school must be aware of
more than mere "inappropriate conduct."5°  Under this standard, a
complaint or report, even if credible, must contain sufficient factual details
to establish an allegation of sexual harassment.5'
Applying Davis, the Tenth Circuit declined to list specific employment
categories fulfilling the notice requirement, finding that the actual
knowledge inquiry must be "fact-based" and dependent on whether the
school employee at issue had "substantial control" over the complained of
conduct.': The court concluded that the employee must be "a school
official who has the authority to halt known abuse, perhaps by measures
such as transferring the harassing student to a different class, suspending
him, curtailing his privileges, or providing additional supervision ...
This standard leaves open the question of whether a teacher's knowledge of
harassment may be imputed to the educational institution."4 Other circuits
have generally indicated that the position of teacher has substantial control
over harassment, thereby satisfying this "actual knowledge" prong in the
Davis test.-
The Ninth Circuit has construed this "actual knowledge" requirement
in only one post-Davis decision, Reece v. Jefferson School District No.
14J.56 A widely publicized case from Oregon, Reece involved four female
high school seniors were suspended from commencement activities for
hiding in the boys' bathroom and throwing water balloons at male
students." The girls claimed that their actions were in retaliation for sexual
harassment they suffered the preceding year. 8 The females filed suit
against the school district contending that the school district failed to take
appropriate action to stop the harassment.
5 9
In denying plaintiffs' Title IX claim, the Reece court ruled that the
school district had no actual notice of the alleged harassment because the
plaintiffs did not report the conduct to school officials until after the school
49. 66 F. Supp. 2d 57, 63 (D. Me. 1999) (a teacher to student harassment case).
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. Murrell v. School Dist. No. I Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238, 1247 (10th Cir. 1999).
53. Id.
54. See id. at 1247-48.
55. See Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 759 (2nd Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1145 (1999); Carroll K. v. Fayette County Bd. of Educ., 19 F. Supp.
2d 618, 621-22 (S.D. W. Va. 1998).
56. 208 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2000).
57. Id. at 738.
58. See id.
59. See id.
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year ended.Wo The Reece court also ruled that though a teacher may have
witnessed one threat by male students toward one of the plaintiffs, this did
not place the institution on notice of the "worse and ongoing alleged
harassment" alleged in the complaint.6' Nor did witnessing one incident
apparently create a duty on the school district's part to investigate the
matter further.62 Finally, the Reece court clarified (from Gebser) that actual
knowledge of the alleged misconduct must be possessed by a school
official "who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged
discrimination," though the court did not specify whether actual knowledge
by a teacher may satisfy this requirement.6
Though Reece gives some indication that the Ninth Circuit will not
liberally construe the "actual notice" prong, much still remains unclear in
this circuit on this issue. Additionally, Reece holds that institutional
knowledge must be shown at the time of the harassment allegation, or "the
school district cannot be deemed to have 'subjected' the plaintiffs to the
harassment. 64 Post-hoc knowledge of purported misconduct is insufficient
because the institution has not been placed on notice to effectively remedy
the situation. Further litigation in this circuit may clarify which specific
employment categories qualify as "actual knowledge" such that
institutional liability may be imputed under Title IX.
2. Deliberate Indifference
A second practical issue flowing from the Davis decision is what
constitutes "deliberate indifference" or "clearly unreasonable" action on the
institution's part in the face of known peer harassment for purposes of Title
IX liability.
Lower courts have struggled with this deliberate indifference standard.
Some district courts have held that to maintain a Title IX claim, a plaintiff
must show that the institution did more than "turn a blind eye" to the
harassment allegation,' or that the acts or omissions of the school must be
more than merely inept, erroneous, ineffective or even negligent.' Other
courts have considered the deliberate indifference standard as an
affirmative defense under which school districts need only show that they
acted promptly in response to allegations to avoid Title IX liability.67
Consequently, schools may be immunized from Title IX liability so long as
60. Id. at 740.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 739.
64. Id.
65. Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 1999).
66. See Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 1998).
67. See Pdddy v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., No. 3:96-CV-473-C, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12968, *19-20 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 13, 1998).
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their officials took timely and reasonable measures to end the harassment.68
However, an institution may not shield itself from liability if the
responsible official only took "minor steps to address the harassment with
the knowledge that such steps would be ineffective. ' 9
Other courts have interpreted the deliberate indifference prong more
favorably to student plaintiffs. At least one First Circuit court has held that
this standard mandates that the educational institution take "timely and
reasonable measures to end the harassment," and it may be required to take
further steps to avoid liability "if it learns that its measures have proven
inadequate," a standard that approaches, if not embraces, negligence." In a
recent Sixth Circuit decision, Vance v. Spencer County Public School
District,7' the Court of Appeals concluded that a school could not evade its
responsibilities under Title IX
by merely investigating and [doing] absolutely nothing more ....
Although no particular response is required, and although the
school district is not required to eradicate all sexual harassment, the
school district must respond and must do so reasonably .... Where
a school district has actual knowledge that its efforts to remediate
are ineffective, and it continues to use those same methods to no
avail, such district has failed to act reasonably in light of the known
circumstances .72
Finally, in a pre-Davis decision, the Seventh Circuit similarly ruled that
it would not absolve an educational institution of Title IX liability unless
the school aggressively investigated all harassment complaints and
responded consistently and meaningfully when those complaints were
found to have merit.
7 3
Questions regarding what may constitute "deliberate indifference" have
not been fully developed in the Ninth Circuit, primarily because in Reece,
the sole post-Davis case in the Circuit, the school district's specific
responses to known harassment were not before the court] Consequently,
though the Ninth Circuit has arguably taken pro-plaintiff positions in its
Title IX harassment decisions prior to Davis, there is no clear indication
how it will approach the factual issues involved in developing the
"deliberate indifference" standard.
68. See Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 854-55 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
2719 (2000); Doe v. School Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F. Supp. 2d 57, 65 (D. Me. 1999);
Vaird v. School Dist. of Phila., No. 99-2727, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6492, at *10 (E.D. Pa.
May 12, 2000).
69. Morlock v. West Cent. Educ. Dist., 46 F. Supp. 2d 892, 910 (D. Minn. 1999).
70. Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1999).
71. No. 99-5095, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 27589, *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 6,2000).
72. Id. at *18.
73. See Chontos v. Rhea, 29 F. Supp. 2d 931,934 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
74. Reece v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000).
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3. Actionable Harassment: The Severe, Pervasive and Objectively
Offensive Standard
In Davis, Justice O'Connor declined to list the types of misconduct
constituting actionable peer harassment, instead opting for a contextual test
which considers factors such as the age of the harasser and victim, the
number of individuals involved, the relationships between the parties, the
specific circumstances of the event and the expectations involved' 5 In
setting out this contextual test, she specifically distinguished the schoolyard
context from the adult workplace, noting that children sometimes engage in
behavior that would be unacceptable in the adult world.76 Consequently,
not every act of teasing or name-calling, even if it targeted at differences
based on sex, gives rise to Title IX liability?77
This contextual standard raises significant questions regarding what
evidence a plaintiff must offer to meet the severe, persistent and objectively
offensive standard. This standard requires a "nexus." For example, the
plaintiff must prove not only that severe, pervasive and offensive
misconduct occurred, but also that she or he was denied equal access to
educational opportunities because of that misconduct. In this regard,
Justice O'Connor indicated that a mere drop in grades by itself is
insufficient evidence to state a Title IX cause of action.78  She also
indicated that more than one incident of wrongful conduct is ordinarily
required, though she left open the possibility that liability may attach for a
single incident of harassment, stating that, "[I]n theory, a single instance of
sufficiently severe one-on-one peer harassment could be said to have... an
effect" of denying access to educational opportunities."
Beyond this brief discussion of the contours of actionable conduct,
Justice O'Connor offered no specific insights as to how courts or schools
should weigh the specific wrongfulness of any misconduct at issue.80 In
light of these analytic and evidentiary concerns, lower courts since Davis
have struggled to fashion the contours of actionable peer harassment. For
example, action resulting in the hospitalization of a student or causing a
student to leave school are sufficient to give rise to a Title IX cause of
action." Most cases are not so obvious. In Seamons v. Snow,82 for
example, the Tenth Circuit found that a male high school student who had
been tied naked to a wall in a school locker room was not entitled to Title
IX damages on the grounds that the conduct at issue was not based on sex. 3
75. 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999).
76. See id. at 651-52.
77. See id. at 651.
78. See id. at 653-54.
79. Id. at 652.
80. See id. at 654.
81. See Murrell v. Colorado, 186 F.3d 1238, 1247 (10th Cir. 1999).
82. 84F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996).
83. See id. at 1233.
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Given this lack of clarity, only through further litigation will the standard
for actionable peer harassment be delineated in the Ninth Circuit.
4. Control and Context of the Harassment: The "Substantial Control" Test
The Davis Court concluded that Title IX liability must be limited "to
circumstances wherein the recipient exercises substantial control over both
the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs."
Institutional liability is only appropriate where the harassment takes place
"'under' an 'operation' of the funding recipient" of which the institution
has actual knowledge and to which it is deliberately indifferent." Under
these circumstances, the institution's own knowingly wrongful conduct or
failure to act contributes to the harms suffered by the student.
Subsequent litigation will be required to determine the contexts and
limits of this "substantial control" test. As a matter of state law, for
example, a California school district's liability for third-party harm to
students is limited to on-campus activities and those off-campus activities
where students are involved in school-related undertakings. 6 California
case law has often construed "school undertakings" narrowly, thereby
limiting school district liability for such third party harms.87 Given this
developed body of state law, the Davis "substantial control" test raises
significant practical questions in California. Under what circumstances do
incidents occurring during post-instructional hours give rise to institutional
liability under Title IX? Must a connection be made to on-campus
instructional hours activities? What about voluntary extra-curricular
events, school dances, graduation night or band night? In short, what are
the edges of institutional "substantial control" under Title IX?
Additionally, may the fact that a school has asserted disciplinary control
over its students for specific non-instructional activities be used to prove
that it has "substantial control" for Title IX purposes? In Reece, the
plaintiffs faced disciplinary action because of their off-campus misconduct
during "senior skip day."'88 May harassment occurring during "senior skip
day" give rise to a Title IX cause of action? These questions remain
unanswered.
D. LIABILITY UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Sexual harassment is a form of sexual discrimination, and plaintiffs
may use the Equal Protection Clause to state peer harassment claims
against educational institutions. 9 Additionally, a school official may be
84. 526 U.S. at 645.
85. Id.
86. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44808, 44809 (2000).
87. See Huff v. Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist., 19 Cal. 4th 925, 945 (1998).
88. 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiffs were barred from participating in their
graduation ceremony).
89. See Murrell v. Colorado, 186 F.3d 1238, 1247 (10th Cir. 1999).
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sued for peer harassment in his or her individual capacity under 42 U.S.C.
section 1983 for violating Equal Protection Clause principles."' In Monell
v. New York Department of Social Services,9' the Supreme Court set forth
the test for institutional liability under the Equal Protection Clause: a
plaintiff must demonstrate either that the discriminatory actions were
representative of the public entity's policy or custom or that they were
carried out by an official with final policy-making authority.92
In the peer sexual harassment context, the Tenth Circuit held that the
existence of student misconduct of a sexual nature does not in and of itself
demonstrate a school custom or policy sufficient to give rise to an Equal
Protection Clause claim against the institution. Additionally, some courts
have concluded that teachers and principals are not "policy-makers" and
therefore cannot be individually sued based on the Equal Protection
Clause. 3 Other courts have suggested that, where teachers and principals
have participated in or consciously acquiesced to peer harassment, they
may face personal liability through a section 1983 claim.94
The Ninth Circuit recognizes that student-victims may bring peer
harassment claims against either educational institutions or offending
officials in their personal capacities under the Equal Protection Clause and
Title IX theories.9 Other circuits have concluded that Equal Protection
Clause claims for peer harassment must be subsumed under Title IX.96
Consequently, in other circuits, plaintiffs may be required to elect under
which federal theory they wish to pursue their peer harassment claims.
III. CALIFORNIA LAW
A. PEER HARASSMENT CLAIMS UNDER THE UNRUH ACT
In California, student litigants may also bring peer harassment lawsuits
under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (hereinafter the "Unruh Act" or the
"Act").97 Two principal questions have shaped peer harassment litigation
under the Unruh Act: (1) are schools "business establishments" and
90. See Oona, R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1453, 1468 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
91. 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978).
92. See id. (citing Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 820 (10th Cir. 1989)).
93. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986); see also David Schimmel, When School's are Liable
for Peer Sexual Harassment: An Analysis of Davis v. Monroe, 141 EDUc. LAW REP. 437
(March 2000) (raising the question of what liability may attach to the actions or inaction of
bus drivers and chaperones).
94. See Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1247.
95. See Oona R.-S., 890 F. Supp. at 1464; see also Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1236
(10th Cir. 1996).
96. See Bruneau v. South Kortright Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 172 (N.D.N.Y. 1996);
Mennone v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53, 57-58 (D. Conn. 1995); Bougher v. University of
Pittsburgh, 713 F. Supp. 139, 146 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
97. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 2001).
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therefore subject to the Act's prohibitions and (2) does the failure to
prevent peer harassment constitute intentionally discriminatory conduct on
the school's part such that it may have violated the Unruh Act? At least
two federal district courts have held that school districts and school
employees may be liable under the Act for failing to adequately remedy
incidents of sexual and racial discrimination.98
The Unruh Act is a broad based civil rights provision prohibiting
discrimination in the provision of facilities and accommodations.
Specifically, section 51 of the California Civil Code states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal,
and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry,
national origin, or disability are entitled to the full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in
all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.99
Under section 51.5, "business establishments" may not discriminate
against any person on the basis of sex.'°° Section 52(a) allows plaintiffs to
recover damages against "whoever denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes
any discrimination or distinction contrary to section 51 or 51.5,"
broadening the Act's scope to include individually discriminatory
conduct.0°' Finally, section 51.9 sets forth the four elements for a sexual
harassment cause of action under the Act.102
98. See Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist, 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1997);
Davison v. Santa Barbara High Sch. Dist., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
99. CAL CIV. CODE § 51 (2000).
100. CAL CIV. CODE § 51.5 (2000).
101. Nicole M., 964 F. Supp. at 1388 (finding that a plaintiff may bring a claim against the
superintendent of a school district and the principal of a school for violations of section
51.5) (citation omitted).
102. California Civil Code section 51.9 elements are as follows: First, a business, service
or professional relationship must exist between the plaintiff and defendant. Second, the
defendant must engage in sexually harassing behavior that was unwelcome and pervasive or
severe. Third, the plaintiff is unable to easily terminate the relationship. Finally, "the
plaintiff has suffered or will suffer economic loss or disadvantage or personal injury." This
code specifically enumerates the kinds of relationships the legislature had in mind to satisfy
the first element of a sexual harassment cause of action under the Act.
The second, third and fourth elements of this provision of the Code were recently
amended. This section now applies to verbal, visual, or physical conduct of a sexual or
hostile nature based on gender. It no longer requires that the conduct be persistent or severe,
rather the conduct must instead be "pervasive or severe." Additionally, sexual harassment
by the defendant can occur even without a request by the plaintiff to stop. The third element
no longer requires the inability of plaintiff to easily terminate the relationship without
tangible hardship; the amendment removes the language "without tangible hardship,"
requiring plaintiffs to only prove an inability to easily terminate the relationship. Finally,
the amended section specifies that a cause of action under section 51.9 applies to an injury
involving emotional distress or the violation of a statutory or constitutional right. While no
cases have been decided under the amended section, it appears the amendments have made
it easier for a plaintiff to show sexual harassment. The second element has been broadened
significantly to include not only sexual advances, solicitations, requests or demands, but
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To state an Unruh Act violation, a plaintiff must show that intentionally
discriminatory acts directed toward him or her have deprived him or her of
equal access to facilities, accommodations or services. Generally,
discriminatory conduct that may have an indirect adverse impact on a
plaintiff is not sufficient for Unruh Act liability.'03 In Harris v. Capital
Growth Investors XIV, the California Supreme Court expressly rejected the
use of a disparate impact analysis, sometimes used in the Title VII
employment litigation context, to prove intentional discrimination under
the Unruh Act.
The first application of the Unruh Act to public schools occurred in a
disability case, Sullivan v. Vallejo Unified School District.0 5 In Sullivan,
the plaintiff, a sixteen-year-old student with learning disabilities, brought
Unruh Act and federal claims against a school district for refusing to allow
her to bring a service dog to school.'O Though it commented that the "plain
meaning" of "business establishment" would appear to exclude public
schools, the court nonetheless allowed the student's claim to go forward
based on the conclusion that the Act must be interpreted "in the broadest
sense reasonably possible."' '
In Petaluma ,"0 a sexual harassment case, the district court also found
that a public school is a business establishment for Unruh Act purposes.
The court concluded that a plaintiff "must prove that the defendant(s)
interfered (or attempted to interfere) with her rights by threats,
intimidations, or coercion.... ."0 In Petaluma I, the court dismissed the
lawsuit because plaintiffs had failed to allege that the defendants
themselves had intentionally engaged in acts of sexual harassment."'
Sullivan and Petaluma I set the stage for Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified
School District."' In Nicole M., the school district directly contended that:
also verbal, visual or physical conduct of a sexual or hostile nature. Although this
apparently changes the definition of sexual harassment, the legislature explicitly states in
section 51.9(d) that the "definition of sexual harassment and the standards for determining
liability set forth in this section shall be limited to determining liability only with regard to a
cause of action brought under this section." Therefore, the changes in the definition of
sexual harassment made in this section presumably do not apply to sections 51 or 51.5.
Section 51.9 has not been applied to peer sexual harassment, but given the recent decisions
in peer harassment cases, it may not be much of a stretch to contemplate a situation where
section 51.9 may be implicated.
103. See Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 1175 (1991)
(dismissing plaintiff's cause of action for violation of the Unruh Act because of defendant's
alleged sex discrimination based on disparate impact).
104. Id.
105. 731 F. Supp. 947, 947 (E.D. Cal. 1990).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 952 (citing Isbister v. Boys Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72, 76 (1985)).
108. 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1582 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
109. Id. at 1582.
110. Id. at 1583-84.
111. 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
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(1) the Act only prohibited intentional discrimination carried out by the
school itself and (2) no precedent existed for application of the Act to the
peer sexual harassment context.'
2
Rejecting defendant's argument, the Nicole M. court concluded that a
school district's "inadequate response to complaints of sexual harassment"
constituted a denial of "advantages, facilities, privileges, or services" for
Unruh Act purposes."' In other words, the court concluded that a student
who has been subjected to a sexually hostile environment at school is
deprived of the advantages and privileges of public education. ' 4
Consequently, when it fails to adequately address such a hostile
environment, the school district itself has engaged in intentional
discriminatory behavior in violation of the Act."5
In Davison v. Santa Barbara High School District, a district court held
that the school district's inadequate response to known acts of racial
discrimination gave rise to an Unruh Act violation. ' 6 The court concluded
that under the Unruh Act, "[a]n educational institution [must] ... provide a
nondiscriminatory environment that is conducive to learning."'"1 7  It
therefore now appears fairly well established that an Unruh Act claim may
be stated against public schools and school personnel for failure to take
steps to remedy known acts of peer harassment. 1
8
B. OTHER BASES UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW FOR PEER HARASSMENT
LAWSUITS
California plaintiffs have attempted to bring peer harassment claims
under the Education Code and general common-law negligence principles.
Education Code sections 200, 212.5, 220 and 230 require school districts to
112. Id. at 1388.
113. Id. at 1389.
114. See id. at 1388-89.
115. See id. at 1389.
116. 48 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1232 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
117. Id. at 1231.
118. Under the Unruh Act, plaintiffs have sued various school personnel, including
principals, superintendents and school districts. Prior to the 1959 adoption of the Unruh
Act, a California court held that a private school is not a "place of amusement or
accommodation within the meaning of Civil Code sections 51 or 52." Reed v. Hollywood
Prof'l Sch., 169 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 887, 889 (1959); see also O'Connor v. Village Green
Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 796 (1983). However, since the adoption of the Unruh Act
courts have interpreted business establishments in the broadest sense reasonably possible.
In fact, the California Supreme Court has held that "the broadened scope of business
establishments in the final version of the bill ... is indicative of an intent by the Legislature
to include therein all private and public groups or organizations.., that may reasonably be
found to constitute 'business establishments of every type [sic] whatsoever."' Village
Green Owners, 33 Cal. 3d at 795-96. Therefore, it is possible that a court would hold that a
private school is liable under the Unruh Act. In general, teachers have not been pursued as
defendants under the Unruh Act. This probably has more to do with the fact that a teacher
would not be considered to be a deep pocket and would not have as much authority to take
remedial action to stop the sexual harassment as a principal.
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prohibit discrimination based on sex and adopt district wide harassment
complaint policies and investigation procedures."9 However, no private
cause of action is expressly provided for under these Education Code
sections.
The Nicole M. court declined to imply a private cause of action under
these Education Code provisions because the plaintiff was already able to
state claims under the Unruh Act and Title IX.'20 Notwithstanding this
ruling, it is not clear that under different circumstances the court would
necessarily bar a private cause of action under the Education Code.
Generally, a private cause of action will be implied under California law if
such private lawsuits are necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the
statute.2'
One California appellate court established its own standard for
determining whether a private cause of action may be implied from a
statute:
when a legislative provision protects a class of persons by
proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a
civil remedy for the violation, the court may... accord to an
injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable
existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an
existing tort action.'2
Until the courts provide better direction regarding the availability of
private causes of action under the Education Code, however, it remains
unclear whether a plaintiff may state a peer sexual harassment claim under
its provisions.
C. NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS
Under California law, public employees are not liable for injury
resulting from the exercise of discretion within the scope of their
employment.'" A discretionary act is one that requires the exercise of
judgment or choice, sometimes defined as an equitable decision of what is
just and proper under the circumstances.'24
In the peer harassment context, courts have also held that "decisions by
a school principal or superintendent to impose discipline on students and
conduct investigations of complaints necessarily require the exercise of
119. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 200, 212.5, 220, 230 (2000).
120. 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1390 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
121. See Arriaga v. Loma Linda Univ., 10 Cal. App. 4th 1556, 1564 (1992).
122. Id. (citing Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mann, 124 Cal. App. 3d 558, 570 (1981)). Although
the Arriaga v. Loma Linda University court acknowledged that this test has arguably been
superseded by Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies, 46 Cal. 3d 287 (1988), the
court assumed that it was still good law, and applied it anyway.
123. See CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 820.2 (2000).
124. See Nicole M., 964 F. Supp. at 1389.
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judgement or choice, and accordingly are discretionary, rather than
ministerial acts."'2'  Public entities are immunized under California
Government Code section 815.2(b) for the discretionary acts of their
employees.'26 Therefore, a California school district would likely be
immune from a negligence claim when the exercise of an employee's
discretion is involved. 7
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT
A. OCR
The OCR is the administrative enforcement agency for Title IX
regulations and may impose financial sanctions for non-compliance with
federal law. OCR first investigates complaints and then determines
whether a funding recipient has complied with Title IX. OCR is primarily
concerned with terminating, refusing to grant or continuing federal funding.
OCR has taken the position that a heightened knowledge requirement is
appropriate for its enforcement procedures.
OCR carries out its responsibility regarding Title IX provisions through
compliance enforcement.28  Its principal enforcement activity is the
investigation and resolution of complaints filed by individuals alleging sex
discrimination at education institutions.2 9  OCR also initiates agency
reviews of selected recipients. 3 ° By doing so, OCR is able to identify and
remedy sex discrimination that may not be addressed through complaint
investigations.
OCR's basic test for peer harassment for the purpose of its
administrative compliance proceeding is: (1) whether a hostile environment
exists; (2) the school knows or should have known of the conduct and (3)
the school fails to take immediate, appropriate steps to remedy it.'' This
125. Id. (citing Petaluma , 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1580-83 (N.D. Cal. 1993)).
126. CAL. Gov'TCODE § 815.2(b) (2000).
127. This is apparently not the case in other jurisdictions. Under Michigan state law, for
example, while principals, superintendents and school districts are immune from suits for
ordinary negligence, they are not immune from suits alleging gross negligence. Under
Michigan law, gross negligence is defined as "conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a
substantial lack of concern of whether an injury results." Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845,
851 (6th Cir. 1999). Further, in Maine, principals, superintendents and school districts do
not have immunity from negligence claims. See Doe v. School Admin. Dist. No. 66, F.
Supp. 2d 57, 68 (1999).
128. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 Prohibits Discrimination Based on
Sex in Education Programs or Activities which Receive Federal Financial Assistance, U.S.
Dep't of Education, Office for Civil Rights (last modified August 1998)
<http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/tixdis/html>.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees,
Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,039-40 (1997) [hereinafter
Guidance].
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OCR standard embraces a "constructive notice" requirement, and is
therefore more stringent than the "actual knowledge" standard set forth in
Davis.'
3 2
The OCR also published sexual harassment guidelines in 1997 ("OCR
Guidelines"). The OCR Guidelines defines sexual harassment as
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature which is sufficiently severe, persistent
or pervasive to limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the
education program or to create a hostile or abusive educational
environment.'"
The complained of conduct must also be unwelcomed as defined by
OCR's Guidelines. According to OCR Guidelines, conduct is unwelcome
if the student being harassed did not "solicit or invite it" and "regarded the
conduct as undesirable or offensive."'35 The inquiry is not whether the
victim's participation was voluntary, but whether he or she indicated by his
or her actions that the sexual conduct was unwelcome.'36 However, a
victim's participation in the sexual conduct may be a factor to consider.'37
If there is a dispute as to whether the conduct actually occurred or was
welcomed, school officials are required to consider several evidentiary
factors.' OCR also requires that the complained of conduct be severe,
pervasive and persistent.'39
132. See id. at 12042. According to OCR's guidance, schools have notice of peer-to-peer
sexual harassment if: (1) a student filed a grievance; (2) a student complained to a teacher
about other students; (3) a student/parent contacted the principal, campus security, bus
driver, teacher, affirmative action officer or Title IX Officer; (4) an agent/responsible
employee may have witnessed the harassment; (5) flyers about the incident were posted at
the school or (6) members of the media / school staff / the educational community provided
indirect notice. See id. Schools will have constructive notice of peer-to-peer sexual
harassment if: (1) they should have known through a "reasonably diligent inquiry"; (2) the
pervasiveness of the harassment, for example, the conduct was observed in the hallways,
graffiti in public places, or conduct observed at recess/P.E. classes under a teacher's
supervision or (3) harassment is pervasive when it is widespread, openly practiced or well-
known to students and staff. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 12041-42. This is the same standard adopted by Justice O'Connor in Davis.
526 U.S. 629 (1999).
135. Guidance, supra note 131, at 12,040.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 12,040-41.
138. See id. These factors include: (1) statements by witnesses; (2) credibility evidence
including corroborative evidence, detail and consistency; (3) evidence that the harasser has
harassed others in the past or that the accuser made false claims in the past; (4) the reaction
or behavior of the accused immediately after the alleged incident and (5) whether the
alleged victim reported the harassment soon after it occurred. See id.
139. See id. at 12,041-42. Factors to be considered when determining if student
harassment was severe, persistent or pervasive include the following: (1) the degree to
which the conduct affected one or more students' education; (2) the type, frequency and
duration of a conduct; (3) the number of individuals involved; (4) the age and sex of the
alleged harasser and the subject(s) of the harassment; (5) the size of the school, location of
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Anyone who believes a grant recipient has engaged in acts of sexual
discrimination under Title IX may file a complaint with OCR.'4°  The
person or organization filing the complaint may be the alleged victim or
filing on behalf of another person or group.' 4 A complaint must be sent to
the OCR enforcement office that serves the state in which the alleged
discrimination occurred.' 42 A complaint must be filed within 180 days of
the alleged discrimination, unless the time for filing is extended for good
cause by the Enforcement Office Director.'
43
This past November, OCR proposed revisions to its 1997 Guidelines.'"
While OCR determined that certain areas in the 1997 Guidelines could be
strengthened by further clarification and explanation, it did not propose a
change to its "constructive knowledge" requirement.'
45
B. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION REGULATIONS
At the state level, the California Department of Education has proposed
revisions to its sexual discrimination regulations applicable to elementary
and secondary education programs in response to Gebser and Davis.'4
the incidents and context in which they occurred; (6) other incidents at the school and (7)
incidents of gender/bias and non-sexual harassment. See id.
140. See How to File a Discrimination Complaint With the Office of Civil Rights, U.S.
Dep't of Educ., Office for Civil Rights (last modified July 9, 1998)
<http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/howto.html>.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. Complaint letters should explain: (1) who was discriminated against; (2) in
what way; (3) by whom or by what institution or agency; (4) when the discrimination took
place; (5) who was harmed; (6) who can be contacted for further information; (7) the name,
address and telephone number of the complainant(s) and (8) the alleged discriminatory
act(s). See id.
144. Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees,
Other Students, or Third Parties, 65 Fed. Reg. 66,092 (2000).
145. Id.
146. 2000 Reg. LEXIS 20589. Specifically, the proposed revisions, if adopted would do
the following: (1) require that school districts comply with both state and federal non-
discrimination laws in any program or activity conducted; (2) require that all educational
programs and activities receiving or benefiting from state or federal funds be available to all
qualified persons without regard to their sex; (3) apply not only to public schools but also to
any educational institution ("educational institution" means any public or private preschool,
elementary or secondary school or institution operated by the local agency, or any
combination of school districts or counties recognized as the administrative agency for
public elementary or secondary schools); (4) apply to local agencies that not only receive
funding from the Department of Education but also to any local agency that receives any
financial assistance from the state or federal government; (5) ensure that local agencies
enforce the nondiscriminatory laws and regulations of American with Disabilities Act, Fair
Employment and Housing Act, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Equal
Educational Opportunities Act and the Unruh Civil Rights Act; (6) extend the prohibition
against sexual harassment to any "extra-curricular activity," other than an athletic activity,
that has all of the following characteristics: the program is supervised or financed by the
local agency, students participating in the program represent the local agency, students
exercise some degree of freedom in either the selection, planning or control of the program
and the program includes both preparation for a performance and performance before an
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Currently, the regulations provide that no person in the State of California
shall be subjected to discrimination or excluded from participation in or
denied benefits of any public school program or activity on the basis of sex
in any program or activity conducted by an educational institution or any
other local agency.
147
V. DEFENSES TO LIABILITY
A. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY GENERALLY
Where applicable, the doctrine of qualified immunity affords public
officials and employees an affirmative defense to personal liability when
they have been sued in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. section
1983. This defense protects "government officials ... from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.""14 Teachers, principals and other school employees are entitled to
assert this qualified immunity defense.49 This qualified immunity defense
is not available to institutions, including public schools.
The qualified immunity test is a two-part inquiry. First, the law
governing the official's conduct must be clearly established. Second, the
reasonable official must have believed his or her conduct to be lawful.
50
audience or spectators; (7) define harassment as unwelcome conduct based upon protected
status that is severe or pervasive, which unreasonably disrupts an individual's educational or
work environment that creates a hostile educational or work environment; (8) include a
definition for "sex" under the regulations ("sex" would be defined as the biological
condition or quality of being a female or male human being); (9) extend the prohibition
against sexual harassment to students in grades K-12 (The disciplinary consequences will
depend upon the age of the student and the factual circumstances of the incident); (10)
prohibit the retaliation against the complainant, witness or other person who supports or
participates in a sexual harassment investigation; (11) require that all complaints or
allegations of sexual harassment be kept confidential during any informal and/or formal
complaint procedures except when necessary to take subsequent remedial measures or
monitor and (12) extend the "educational environment" to include campus or school
grounds, properties controlled or owned by the school district and off-campus activities
sponsored by the school district or conducted by organizations sponsored by or affiliated
with the school district. See id.
147. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. v, § 4900-4940 (1993). Under the regulations, a "local
agency" is defined as a school district governing board or county office of education or a
local public or private agency, which receives funding from the Department of Education to
provide programs or activities. See id. at § 4910.
148. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
149. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318 (1975); see also Bruneau v. South
Kortright Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 1998) (school officials are entitled to immunity);
Niles v. Nelson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 15 (1999) (school officials are entitled to immunity);
Mennone v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53 (D.C. Conn. 1995) (teachers entitled to immunity);
Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 1999) (teacher, principal, Director of Special
Education and school district superintendent are entitled to immunity); Petaluma 11, 54 F.3d
1447 (9th Cir. 1995) (school counselor entitled to immunity).
150. See Act up!IPortland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871-73 (9th Cir. 1992).
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Conversely, if the federal law is clearly established and the reasonable
official would not have engaged in the conduct at issue, the official in
question may not assert the qualified immunity defense.5 However, it is
not necessary that a prior decision rule that "the very action in question" is
unlawful for a public official to be denied qualified immunity protection.5 2
Rather, "the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear so that a
reasonable official would know that his conduct violates that right."'13 If
the law at the time is not clearly established, however, the official cannot
be expected to anticipate future legal developments and is entitled to
qualified immunity. 5
Prior to Gebser and Davis, the Ninth Circuit allowed sexual
discrimination suits against school officials in their individual capacities
predicated on either equal protection or Title IX harassment legal
theories. 55  With respect to Equal Protection Clause claims, the Ninth
Circuit rejected a public official's claim of qualified immunity in Lindsey v.
Shalmy.'56 The discriminatory conduct in Lindsey took place in 1988, and
the appellate court concluded that "well prior to 1988 the protection
afforded under the Equal Protection Clause was held to proscribe any
purposeful discrimination by state actors, be it in the workplace or
elsewhere, directed at an individual solely because of his membership in a
protected class.' ' 57 In Oona, R.-S., the Ninth Circuit similarly found that
school officials have a duty to ensure their institutional environments are
free from peer harassment. 58 The Ninth Circuit therefore holds that school
officials may be sued individually based on their intentional failure or
participation in acts of harassment from 1988 onward.'59
151. See id. at 873.
152. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); see also Neely v. Feinstein, 50
F.3d 1502, 1507 (9th Cir. 1995).
153. Browning v. Vernon, 44 F.3d 818, 823 (9th Cir. 1995). Public officials are expected
to know basic constitutional rights, but a mere finding that the official violated the
constitution does not satisfy the "clearly established law" prong of the qualified immunity
analysis. In fact, the Supreme Court has consistently extended the protection of qualified
immunity to officials who have violated constitutional amendments, if the laws interpreting
those amendments were unclear or contradictory. To invoke the defense of qualified
immunity the official must show that the rights violated were not clearly established at the
time or under the circumstances of the situation or that other reasonable officials would have
acted in the same way. See, e.g., Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (granting immunity to officers
conducting illegal warrantless searches of innocent party's home); Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335 (1986) (granting immunity to officers that have caused unconstitutional arrest);
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (granting qualified immunity to police officials
alleged to have conducted warrantless wiretaps in violation of Fourth Amendment).
154. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982).
155. See Oona, R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Nicole
M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
156. 29 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1994).
157. Id. at 1386.
158. 143 F.3d 473, 475 (9th Cir. 1998).
159. See id.
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The Nicole M. court found that school officials have a clear duty under
the Equal Protection Clause to take steps to eliminate intentional
discrimination on the basis of sex. Consequently, the court concluded that
the school principal was not entitled to qualified immunity from personal
liability if it could be clearly established that a reasonable official in the
same position would have taken steps to end the harassment."6
In Petaluma II, the Ninth Circuit considered whether school officials
had a duty under Title IX to prevent peer sexual harassment in the period
from fall of 1990 to February 1992.16 Because the allegedly impermissible
conduct in Petaluma I occurred prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Franklin, the Ninth Circuit held that as of February 1992, school officials
had no clearly established duty under Title IX to remedy peer sexual
harassment and were therefore entitled to qualified immunity.'62 However,
the court recognized that the Franklin decision clearly established that
school officials have a duty, as of the date of that decision, to prevent peer
harassment.'
The Ninth Circuit has not revisited the issue of immunity subsequent to
Davis. However, since 1993, it has been clearly established in the Ninth
Circuit that a student has the right to be free from peer sexual harassment
under both the Equal Protection Clause and under Title IX. It is therefore
unlikely that school district officials, administrators and teachers who have
actual knowledge of peer sexual harassment and show deliberate
indifference to the wrongful conduct will now be shielded from personal
liability.
B. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
The Eleventh Amendment 64 to the United States Constitution prohibits
federal suits against state governments by a state's own citizens, by citizens
of another state or by citizens of foreign countries. Broadly, this concept of
state sovereignty protects states from federal suits in federal courts.
California schools are state agencies for Eleventh Amendment purposes.'6"
States accepting funds from the federal government waive their right to
claim sovereign immunity in Title IX cases. Section 42 U.S.C. 2000d-
7(a)(1) states:
[Al state shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of
160. See 964 F. Supp. at 1382-83.
161. 54 F.3d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir. 1995).
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. U.S. CONST. amend. XI states, 'The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign
state."
165. See Kirchmann v. Lake Elsinore Unified Sch. Dist., No. E026060, 2000 Cal. App.
LEXIS 785 (Oct. 11, 2000).
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the Constitution of the United States from suit in federal court for
violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, the Age Discrimination Act of
1975, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the provisions of
any other federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of
Federal financial assistance."
Congress may also abrogate, abolish or annul a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity if it clearly expresses its intent to do so and acts
pursuant to a valid exercise of power. 67 The Supreme Court has stated that
Congress may validly abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity if
it acts pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the authority to
enforce the Amendment's substantive provisions, which proscribe gender
discrimination in education.'69 Similarly, Congress had the authority,
pursuant to Section Five, to make Title IX applicable to the states.' 70 Based
on this reasoning, several circuits have held that Congress's intention to
abrogate the states' Title IX immunity was unmistakably clear pursuant to
its authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment and,
therefore, a state is not entitled to invoke sovereign immunity in a Title IX
171
case.
C. PERSONAL LIABILITY DEFENSES UNDER THE CALIFORNIA TORT
CLAIMS ACT
A school district may be obligated under the California Tort Claims
Act to defend and indemnify an employee against any lawsuits brought
against its employee arising from the scope of his or her employment. 7  A
school district may be obligated to defend a peer harassment suit, including
one based on federal law, filed against its employee in his or her individual
capacity. Indeed, the California Supreme Court held in Williams v.
Horvath173 that the indemnification provisions of the Tort Claims Act apply
166. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (2000). An educational institution may be entitled to
invoke sovereign immunity where the student alleges negligence on the school's part.
Bosley v. Kearney R-1 School District held that in the unique instance of a state run school,
sovereign immunity may bar suits premised on a negligence theory. 904 F. Supp. 1006
(W.D. Mo. 1995).
167. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
168. See id. at 45-46 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)).
169. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
170. See Doe v. University of Ill., 138 F.3d 653, 659-60 (7th Cir. 1998).
171. See Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000); Franks v.
Kentucky Sch. for the Deaf, 142 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 1998); Doe v. University of Ill., 138
F.3d 653, 657 (7th Cir. 1998); Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281 (8th Cir. 1997).
172. See CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 825 (2000). Section 825 of the Government Code permits
the employing entity to reserve the right to refuse to pay a judgment until it is established
that the employee's acts were in fact within the scope of employment.
173. 16 Cal. 3d 834 (1976). Williams involved the applicability of the California Tort
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regardless of whether: (1) the lawsuit is grounded on a public entity's
statutory liability under the Tort Claims Act' 74 or (2) the public official is
being sued in his or her official capacity under a 42 U.S.C. section 1983
claim. "'75 Therefore, a school district employee, such as a principal, may
require a school district to defend and indemnify him or her against a suit
based on his or her failure to take discretionary remedial actions to stop
peer harassment.
The immunity and indemnification issues raised by Title IX lawsuits
are extremely complex and not completely settled in the Ninth Circuit. It
appears that public educational institutions can not raise sovereign
immunity as a defense to Title IX lawsuits. Additionally, school officials
and employees may be subject to personal liability under Title IX and the
Unruh Act if they fail to prevent peer sexual harassment taking place in
circumstances under their control. However, it also appears that the
California Government Code's defense and indemnification provisions may
be available to school officials and employees in instances where their
failure to act caused harassment to occur at schools.
VI. CONCLUSION
It has now been over a year since the Davis decision came down, and it
is still not clear what, if any, implications it may have for California
schools. Certainly, Davis established the general liability standard for peer
harassment under Title IX. However, as discussed above, several questions
remain regarding all elements of the Davis test. The only post-Davis
decision in the Ninth Circuit, Reece, left open issues relating to what
constitutes actual notice and deliberate indifference. California school
districts must also be aware of liability issues flowing from the Unruh Act.
It now appears settled that an Unruh Act claim may be stated against a
public school district and its officials and employees for failure to remedy
known acts of peer harassment on school grounds. As decisional authority
related to the use of the Unruh Act to state peer harassment claims remains
Claims Act to an action grounded exclusively on the federal Civil Rights Act. Id.
Specifically, the Court had to decide whether the indemnifications provisions of the Tort
Claims Act, Government Code section 825, applied to suits brought under section 1983.
The Williams court held that not only did the claims presentation requirement of the statute
need not be met in order to file an action based on section 1983, but also the indemnification
provisions apply regardless of whether the lawsuit is grounded on the Tort Claims Act or on
section 1983. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court analyzed the history and
purpose of the Tort Claims Act and the federal Civil Rights Act. The Court noted that the
state scheme was conceived to strictly limit governmental liability while the federal statute
was designed to ensure an adequate remedy for violations of civil rights. See id.
174. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 815. Under the Tort Claims Act, a public entity is liable in tort
only to the extent declared by statute and have certain immunities and defenses. Id.
175. Section 1983 is a federal statute designed to ensure an adequate remedy for violations
of civil rights and can be invoked against a public official, in his individual capacity, who
infringes on such rights.
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underdeveloped, it is not clear whether school districts have greater duties
to remedy peer harassment under its provisions than they do under Title IX.
Finally, though California school districts may not be exempt from Title IX
suits, school officials and employees might be able to receive
indemnification, under certain circumstances, from personal liability.
